We consider the problem of budget feasible mechanism design proposed by Singer (2010), but in a Bayesian setting. A principal has a public value for hiring a subset of the agents and a budget, while the agents have private costs for being hired. We consider both additive and submodular value functions of the principal. We show that there are simple, practical, ex post budget balanced posted pricing mechanisms that approximate the value obtained by the Bayesian optimal mechanism that is budget balanced only in expectation. A main motivating application for this work is the crowdsourcing large projects, e.g., on Mechanical Turk, where workers are drawn from a large population and posted pricing is standard. Our analysis methods relate to contention resolution schemes in submodular optimization of Vondrák et al. (2011) and the correlation gap analysis of Yan (2011).
Introduction
Consider the problem of hiring workers to complete complex tasks on crowdsourcing platforms such as Mechanical Turk. A principal must select a set of participants, henceforth agents, whose contributions will be aggregated to complete a task. The principal's value for the task is a function of the set of participants selected and the principal's budget limits the total payments to participants. We assume that the principal's value is submodular, i.e., it exhibits diminishing returns to recruiting additional participants. The participants have a private cost for participating and will choose to participate strategically to optimize their payments received relative to this cost. The principal seeks a budget feasible mechanism for selecting participants so as to maximize the value of the completed task.
The literature on budget feasible mechanism design initiated by Singer (2010) studies this problem; however, it primarily considers sealed-bid mechanisms which do not tend to be seen on crowdsourcing platforms like Mechanical Turk. Instead, these platforms use posted pricing mechanisms. We follow a traditional economics approach to this problem where agents' costs are drawn from a common prior distribution and a mechanism is sought to optimize the principal's value function in expectation. Note that this approach is especially relevant to the principal's problem as the workers on crowdsourcing platforms are drawn from a large population of available workers. Following a line of literature in mechanism design that was initiated by Chawla et al. (2010) , we show that posted pricing mechanisms give a good approximation to the optimal sealed-bid mechanism. Additionally, we give efficient algorithms for calculating the appropriate prices.
Our methods allow the principal's value function and distributions of agents' costs to be asymmetric. For the application of our methods to crowdsourcing, these asymmetries arise from the participant's geographic origin, skill level, previous participation in similar tasks, or demographic. For these asymmetric settings, the posted pricings our methods calculate are asymmetric. In settings that exhibit symmetry with respect to the agents, a uniform price will be posted to all agents. Furthermore in symmetric cases, our bounds for computation and approximation for submodular value functions can be improved.
In comparison to other work in optimization of prices in crowdsourcing, our work focuses on the use of prices to control participation not the level of effort of participants. Controlling the level of effort of participants was studied in online behavioral experiments by Ho et al. (2015) , theoretically for crowdsourcing contests by Chawla et al. (2012) , and for user generated content by Immorlica et al. (2013) .
Overview of Approach. Our approach follows similarly to that of Alaei (2014) and Yan (2011) . The starting point for our analysis is an upper bound on the performance of the optimal sealed bid mechanism that relaxes the ex post constraints on the mechanism to hold ex ante, i.e., in expectation over the private costs of the agents. Via this ex ante relaxation and the Myerson (1981) theory of virtual values, we construct a posted price mechanism that is budget feasible in expectation and a 1 − 1/e approximation to the optimal ex ante mechanism when the principal's value function exhibits decreasing returns, i.e., is submodular. For the special case where the principal's value function is additive, this posted pricing is optimal (for the ex ante relaxation).
We then consider posting the prices from the solution to the ex ante relaxation until the budget runs out. The resulting mechanism is ex post budget feasible, but suffers a loss in performance because the budget may run out early. The main technical contribution of this work is in methods for showing that the performance of such a price posting mechanism compares favorably to the optimal sealed-bid mechanism. Our analyses follow two basic approaches. To analyze the performance of the posted pricing under any arrival order of the agents, we solve the ex ante relaxation with a slightly smaller budget and then, using methods from the Vondrák et al. (2011) analysis of contention resolution schemes, show that it is unlikely for the original ex post budget constraint to bind. We obtain better bounds for additive value functions and when the order of agent arrivals can be specified by the mechanism via the correlation gap approach of Yan (2011) .
The prices suggested by the ex ante relaxation can be computed exactly for additive value functions and approximated to within a factor of 1 − 1/e for submodular value functions. For additive value functions, the optimization problem simplifies to a monopoly pricing problem of classic microeconomics. Similarly to the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) treatment of welfare maximization subject to budget balance in a buyer-seller exchange, optimization in this context is based on Lagrangian virtual surplus. For submodular functions, we reduce the problem directly to the well-known greedy algorithm for submodular optimization.
Related work. The prior literature on budget feasibility primarily considers a worst-case design and analysis framework that compares the performance of the designed mechanism to the first-best outcome, i.e., the one that could be obtained if the agents' costs were public. See Singer (2010) , Bei et al. (2012) , Badanidiyuru et al. (2012) , and Anari et al. (2014) . Our analysis compares the designed mechanism, in expectation for the known prior distribution, to the second-best outcome, i.e., the one obtained by the Bayesian optimal mechanism. Our comparison to the second-best 
Figure 1: Our results for posted pricing mechanisms are compared to the Bayesian optimal mechanism. Bounds are parameterized by k, a lower bound on the number of agents that can be simultaneously selected with the given budget (see Definition 4). The results with the contention resolution approach require k ≥ 4 and ∈ (2/k, 1/2). Our results are compared to those of Anari et al. (2014) which are for sealed bid mechanisms, without a prior distribution, and in comparison to the first-best outcome. The computational results (first four rows) also have an additional o(1) loss due to discretization.
outcome isolates the loss from a simple decentralized pricing over the optimal centralized mechanism as the quantity of interest.
The following results are for prior-free mechanisms in comparison to the first-best outcome. Singer (2010) obtained a randomized truthful budget feasible mechanism with a constant factor approximation for submodular value functions, Chen et al. (2011) then improved the analysis of this mechanism to a 7.91 approximation. In the Bayesian setting, Bei et al. (2012) obtained a large constant approximation for subadditive functions. More recently, Anari et al. (2014) considered large markets, which we also consider in this paper. Finally, Badanidiyuru et al. (2012) also considered posted pricing mechanisms when the agents arrive online. They obtained a large constant approximation for the class of symmetric submodular functions. A value function is symmetric if the value of a set only depends on the cardinality of that set of agents. They also obtain a O(log n) mechanism for the case of submodular functions. In comparison to this last paper, we give much better bounds when a prior distribution on costs is known.
Budget feasibility has also been studied in the context of crowdsourcing (as above, without a prior distribution). Among that line of work, the model considered in Anari et al. (2014) is the closest to ours, and will be compared in detail below. Singla and Krause (2013) and Singer and Mittal (2013) consider the special case of our model where the principal's value function is the number of tasks performed. The former studies posted pricing for agents with i.i.d. costs from an unknown distribution; while the latter studies sealed bid mechanisms without a prior.
Our results. Our results are summarized in Figure 1 . We consider two main classes of valuation functions, additive and submodular. We use two different methods to obtain posted price mechanisms, one is based on contention resolution schemes and the other on correlation gap. Contention resolution schemes give an oblivious posted price mechanism, i.e., one that obtains its proven bound under any arrival order of the agents. The correlation gap approach gives a sequential posted price mechanism for the special case where the principal has an additive value function. This mechanism offers agents prices in a predetermined order. We give bounds for large markets that hold when the ratio between the budget and the largest posted price grows large. Our results for large markets offer an improvement on those from Anari et al. (2014) ; their prior-free sealed bid mechanisms are compared to the first-best outcome while our Bayesian posted pricing mechanisms are compared to the second-best, i.e., Bayesian optimal, outcome.
Paper Organization. We start with preliminaries in Section 2 to introduce the model and the different techniques used in this paper. We then describe posted price mechanisms for the ex ante relaxation, where the budget holds in expectation, in Section 3. We explain how to go from an ex ante posted price mechanism to an ex post posted price mechanism using two different methods, one inspired by contention resolution schemes in Section 4 and another based on a correlation gap analysis in Section 5. Finally, we tackle the computation issues of finding a good ex ante mechanism in Section 6. In this paper, we assume that the valuation function is monotone and submodular.
Preliminaries
There are n agents N = {1, . . . , n}. Agent i has a private cost c i for providing a service that is drawn from a distribution F i (denoting the cumulative distribution function) with density f i . Indicator variable x i denotes whether or not i provides service and p i denotes the payment i receives. The agent aims to optimize her utility given by p i − c i x i . The cost profile is denoted c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ); the joint distribution on costs is the product distribution F = F 1 × · · · × F n ; the payment profile is denoted p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ); and the allocation profile is denoted x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
The principal has a value function v : {0, 1} n → R. For allocation profile x ∈ {0, 1} n or set of agents S = {i : x i = 1} who provide service, the value to the principal is v(x) = v(S). The designer has a budget B and requires the payments to the agent not to exceed the budget, i.e., i p i ≤ B. The following mathematical program captures the principal's objective.
(1)
x(·) and p(·) are incentive compatible.
We consider only mechanisms that are incentive compatible. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC), if truthful reporting of the agents is a dominant strategy equilibrium. 1 We will consider the budget constraint both ex ante, i.e., in expectation over realizations of agents' costs and random choices of the mechanism, and ex post, i.e., the payments to the agents never exceed the budget. The main goal of this paper is to approximate the optimal ex ante budget feasible mechanism with an ex post budget feasible posted pricing mechanism. Posted pricing mechanisms are incentive compatible, trivially.
Definition 1. The posted pricing (ĉ, σ), for pricesĉ and ordering on agents σ, is:
1. The remaining budget is initially B.
2. The agents arrive in order σ.
3. If agent i arrives with cost c i below her offered priceĉ i which is below the remaining budget, then select this agent for service, pay herĉ i , and deductĉ i from the remaining budget. Otherwise, discard this agent.
For (implicit) distribution on values F , we can equivalently specify a posted pricing (ĉ, σ) as (q, σ) whereq i = F i (ĉ i ) is the marginal probability that agent i with cost c i ∼ F i would accept the priceĉ i . 2
Note that the pricesĉ are non-adaptive, i.e., fixed before the agents arrive. We consider posted pricing mechanisms under two different models for agent arrival. In the sequential posted pricing model, the ordering σ can be fixed in advance by the mechanism and, without computational considerations, our analysis is for the best case ordering of the prices. In the oblivious posted pricing model, the ordering σ is unconstrained and our analysis is in worst case with respect to this ordering. An oblivious posted pricing is denotedĉ. We will be comparing our mechanisms to an ex ante posted pricingĉ where the budget constraint holds in expectation, i.e., iĉ iqi ≤ B. The value of an ex ante posted pricing is E S∼q [v(S)] where S ∼q adds each agent i to S independently with probabilityq i .
The paper focuses on value functions that are monotone and submodular (Definition 2). An important special case, which we will treat separately, is that of additive value functions where each agent has a value v i and the value function is
• (submodularity) for all T ⊂ S the marginal contribution of i ∈ S to T is at least its marginal contribution to S. In other words,
Our analysis is based on the relationship between a set function and two standard extensions of a set functions from the domain {0, 1} n to the domain [0, 1] n . For submodular set functions, these extensions were studied by Calinescu et al. (2007) and Agrawal et al. (2010) .
• its concave closure V + (·) (a.k.a., correlated value) is the smallest concave function that upper bounds the set function. Alternatively,
with the maximization taken over all distributions D with marginal probabilitiesq = (q 1 , . . . ,q n ); and
• its multilinear extension V (·) (a.k.a., independent value) is the expected value of the set function when each element i is drawn independently with marginal probabilityq i . In other words,
For any set function, the concave closure is clearly an upper bound on the multilinear extension. For submodular functions the inequality approximately holds in the opposite direction as well. By the interpretation of the multilinear extension as the expected value of the set function for independent distribution and the concave closure as the expected value of the set function for correlated distributions, their worst case ratio over marginal probabilitiesq is known as the correlation gap (Agrawal et al., 2010) .
Theorem 1 (Calinescu et al., 2007 , Agrawal et al., 2010 . For monotone submodular set function v(·), the correlation gap is
Theorem 2 (Yan, 2011) . For a k-highest-value-elements set function v(·), which is additive with value v i for element i up to a capacity of at most k elements, the correlation gap is
Our analysis will be parameterized by a measure of the size of the market. This notion of market size is standard in the literature, e.g., see Bei et al. (2012) and Anari et al. (2014) . A large market analysis considers the market size in the limit. 
The Ex Ante Budget Feasible and Concave Closure Relaxations
In this section we relax the objective function and the budget constraint to make the problem more amenable to optimization. We first relax the budget constraint so that it only holds in expectation, making it an ex ante feasibility constraint. We then upper bound the value function by its concave closure. With an ex ante feasibility constraint, the objective is to optimize the following program over allocation rule x(·) and payment rule p(·) with c ∼ F .
(2)
x(·) and p(·) are IC.
When payments are part of the principal's objective or constraints, the Bayesian mechanism design problem will typically rely on the Myerson (1981) theory of virtual values or, in our case where the agents are sellers, virtual costs. The virtual cost of agent i with cost
Lemma 3 (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) . In any incentive compatible mechanism, any agent i's expected payment is equal to her expected virtual surplus, i.e., for c ∼ F ,
The definition of virtual costs and Lemma 3 allows program (2) to be rewritten in terms of the allocation rule only. To do so, we invoke the following characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms of Myerson (1981) .
Lemma 4 (Myerson, 1981) . There exists an incentive compatible mechanism with allocation rule x(·) if and only if x(·) is monotone in the cost of any agent.
We now rewrite the optimization program (2) by substituting in virtual costs for payments to obtain the following virtual surplus program,
(3)
x(·) is monotone in the cost of any agent.
For the general case of submodular value functions, the expected value of the set function v(·) is upper bounded by its concave closure (Definition 3) as follows. The allocation rule x(·) that optimizes this virtual surplus program induces, for c ∼ F , a distribution over sets of winning agents. Denote this distribution by D and denote byq the profile of marginal probabilities, i.e., witĥ
The payment to an agent is lower bounded by the payment from price posting. As above, the optimal mechanism selects agent i with probabilityq i . When virtual values are monotonically increasing, i.e., in the case of regular distributions, the expected payment to an agent i selected with probabilityq i is minimized if agent i is served if and only if c i ≤ F −1 i (q i ) by Lemma 3 since these costs minimize φ i (c). 3 Thus, the mechanism that minimizes expected payments and serves each agent i with probabilityq i is the mechanism that posts priceĉ i = F −1 i (q i ) to each agent i.
Lemma 5. For an agent with cost drawn from regular distribution F i and any incentive compatible mechanism that selects agent i with probabilityq i , the expected payment of agent i is at leastq iĉi
Combining the relaxation of the value function and the relaxation of the payments we obtain the following concave closure program,
Lemma 6. Letq + be the optimal solution to the concave closure program (4), then V + (q + ) upper bounds the performance of the optimal ex ante mechanism.
Posted price mechanisms are trivially incentive compatible. Since the distributions of agents' costs are independent, the set of agents who will accept their offer with a posted price mechanism is a set which will contain each agent with some probability q i independently. Therefore the performance of a posted price mechanism where agents accept their offer with probabilities q is the multilinear extension V (q). This motivates us to rewrite the concave closure program (4) as the following multilinear extension program,
Maximizing the multilinear extension program gives us an ex ante posted price mechanism that is approximately optimal.
Theorem 7. Letq be the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5). Then the ex ante mechanism that posts priceĉ i = F −1 i (q i ) to each agent i is an 1 − 1/e approximation to the optimal ex ante mechanism in the case of monotone submodular value functions.
Proof. Letq + be the optimal solution to the concave closure program (4). By Theorem 1,
upper bounds the performance of the optimal ex ante mechanism by Lemma 6, posting price F −1 i (q i ) to each agent is an 1 − 1/e approximation to the optimal ex ante mechanism.
Note that in the additive case where each agent has value v i , V (q) = V + (q) = i v i q i and we get the following corollary.
Corollary 8. Letq be the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5). Then the ex ante mechanism that posts priceĉ i = F −1 i (q i ) to each agent i is an optimal mechanism in the case of additive value functions.
We discuss the computational issues of finding a good solution q to the multilinear extension program (5) in Section 6. For the case of submodular functions, we reduce the problem to submodular function maximization (with a cardinality constraint) for which the greedy algorithm gives an 1 − 1/e approximation. In the additive case, we will show that the optimal ex ante budget feasible mechanism can be found by taking the Lagrangian relaxation of the virtual surplus program (3).
Submodular Value and Oblivious Posted Pricing
In the previous section, we obtained an ex ante mechanism by optimizing the multilinear extension program (5) . In this section we analyze the performance of oblivious posted pricing (with an ex post budget constraint).
The approach of this section is the following: lower the budget by some small amount and optimize the multilinear extension program (5) so that the lowered budget is satisfied ex ante. With the budget sufficiently lowered, with high probability the cost (sum of prices) of the set of agents who would accept their offer is under the original budget (regardless of their arrival order and ex post).
This approach is a special case of that taken by the contention resolution schemes of Vondrák et al. (2011) and we first review some known bounds. The first comes from the submodularity of the value function; the second comes from the Chernoff bound.
Theorem 9 (Bansal et al., 2010) . Given a non-negative monotone submodular function v(·), a distribution D over sets, and a (possibly randomized) procedure π that maps (possibly infeasible) sets to feasible sets such that,
Theorem 10 . Given ∈ (0, 1/2), an independent distribution over sets with marginalsq, costsĉ, and budget B such that,
• (scaled ex ante budget constraint) iĉ iqi ≤ (1 − ) B, and
then the probability that the sum of costs of selected agents does not exceed the budget less the cost of any agent, i.e., Pr R∼q
We now connect these two results by relating the probability that the sum of costs does not exceed (1 − 1/k)B of Theorem 10 to γ of Theorem 9 and then show that posted pricings satisfy the conditions of Theorem 9.
Lemma 11. For sequential posted pricing (ĉ, σ) that satisfy the scaled ex ante budget constraint and k-large market conditions, the probability that an agent is offered her price is lower bounded by Pr R∼q i∈Rĉ i ≤ (1 − 1/k)B , the probability that the sum of the prices of agents who would accept their offered price is at most (1 − 1/k)B.
Proof. If the total cost of all agents who would accept their price is at most (1 − 1/k)B then this budget remains at the time an agent i is considered in the sequence σ. By the definition of k ≥ B/ĉ i it is feasible to serve this agent and so she is offered her priceĉ i by the sequential posted pricing mechanism.
Lemma 12. For sequential posted pricing (q, σ), if each agent is offered her price with probability at least γ, then the expected value of the mechanism is at least γV (q).
Proof. It suffices to show, for sequential posted pricing (q, σ) with an ex post budget constraint B, that the marginal and monotonicity properties of Theorem 9 hold.
In our case, D is the random set of agents who would accept their offer if the budget never runs out. Given a set of agents R who accept their offer, define π(R) to be the set of agents who accept their offer and who arrive before the budget runs out. In our case, π is deterministic given the ordering σ. Note that Pr R∼D;π [i ∈ π(R) | i ∈ R] is equal to the probability that an agent gets offered his price, meaning that she arrives before the budget runs out. Thus, by the assumption of the lemma the marginal property holds.
For the monotonicity property, consider two sets T ⊆ S. When an agent i arrives in the posted price mechanism, the mechanism has spent less if the set of agents who accept their offer is T than if this set is S. Therefore i ∈ π(S) implies that i ∈ π(T ) and the monotonicity property holds.
By combining the previous results, we obtain the main theorem for this section.
Theorem 13. For ∈ (0, 1/2), if the oblivious posted pricing defined for each agent byĉ i = F −1 i (q i ), whereq is the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5) with budget (1 − )B, satisfies 2/ ≤ k ≤ B/ max iĉi , then this posted pricing mechanism is a (1 − 1/e)(1 − )(1 − e − 2 (1− )k/12 ) approximation to the optimal mechanism for submodular value functions and (1 − )(1 − e − 2 (1− )k/12 ) for additive value functions.
Proof. The proof starts with the ex ante mechanism from the previous section and then applies results from this section to modify it into an ex post mechanism.
Letq be the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5) with budget (1 − )B, q +
(1− )B be the optimal solution to the concave closure program (4) with budget (1 − )B, andq + B be the optimal solution to the concave closure program (4) with budget B. By the optimality ofq and Theorem 1,
Note that the solution (1 − )q + B has cost at most (1 − )B since F −1 i (·) is increasing. So by the optimality ofq + (1− )B and by the concavity of the concave closure V + (·),
is an upper bound on the performance of the optimal ex ante mechanism by Lemma 6, the ex ante posted pricing mechanism defined for each agent byĉ i = F −1 i (q i ) is a (1 − 1/e)(1 − ) approximation to the optimal mechanism.
We now consider the posted pricing mechanism defined byĉ that is no longer ex ante. Since the budget has been lowered by a factor 1 − , each agent is offered her price with probability at least Pr R∼q i∈Rĉ i ≤ (1 − 1/k)B by Lemma 11, regardless of the ordering σ of agents. By Theorem 10, this probability is at least 1 − e − 2 (1− )k/12 . Therefore, by Lemma 12, the expected value of this mechanism is at least (1 − e − 2 (1− )k/12 )V (q) and this mechanism is a (1 − )(1 − 1/e)(1 − e − 2 (1− )k/12 ) approximation to the optimal mechanism in the case of submodular value functions. In the case of additive functions, there is no loss from the multilinear extension to the concave closure, so the mechanism is a (1 − )(1 − e − 2 (1− )k/12 ) approximation.
Note that as the size of the market k grows to infinity, this approximation ratio approaches 1 − 1/e. Also note that this mechanism requires the market to be at least 4-large. In the full version of this paper, we show that we can easily obtain a (1 − 1/e)/8 posted pricing mechanism for any market size using a more sophisticated result from Vondrák et al. (2011) . This posted pricing attains its performance guarantee when agents with cost at least B/4 arrive before all others, but otherwise the order is oblivious.
Additive Value and Sequential Posted Pricing
In this section we give improved bounds for sequential posted pricing, i.e., where the mechanism orders the agents, and when the value function is additive, i.e., v(S) = i∈S v i . In particular, we analyze the sequential posted pricing (ĉ, σ) withĉ i = F −1 i (q i ) from the solution to the multilinear extension program (5) with the full budget B and the ordering σ by decreasing bang-per-buck, i.e., v i /ĉ i for agent i.
Our results in this section are based on the analysis of the correlation gap of fractional and integral-knapsack set functions (to be defined subsequently). The fractional-knapsack set function is a submodular function, so a correlation gap of 1 − 1/e can be directly obtained (Theorem 1). In this section, we improve this bound to 1 − 1/ √ 2πk for k-large markets, i.e., with k = B/ max iĉi . From this bound we observe that the correlation gap for fractional-knapsack in large market is asymptotically one. We show that the integral-knapsack correlation gap is nearly the same. Following the approach of Yan (2011) , the factor by which sequential posted pricing approximates the ex ante relaxation is equal to the integral-knapsack correlation gap.
Definition 5. The fractional-knapsack set function corresponding to additive set function v(S) = i∈S v i , sizesĉ, and capacity B is denoted v B (S) and equals the maximum value solution to the corresponding fractional-knapsack problem on elements S. 4 The integral-knapsack set function can be defined analogously to the fractional one, but it cannot add elements fractionally.
Most of this section analyzes the ratio of the independent value of fractional-knapsack to the correlated value of v(·) (see Definition 3 for the definition of independent and correlated values) in the case where the budget constraint is met ex ante, i.e.,
We then show that this ratio is equal to the approximation ratio of the sequential posted pricing mechanism. Finally, we use this ratio to bound the integral, and fractional, knapsack correlation gap.
The main idea to derive a bound on this ratio is to show that it is minimized when all agents have equal cost B/k, in which case, when the budget constraint is met ex ante, we can then apply the result from Yan (2011) for the correlation gap of the k-highest-value-elements set function.
Lemma 14. For any additive value function v and budget B, over marginal probabilitiesq and pricesĉ that (a) satisfy the ex ante budget constraint, i.e., iĉ iqi ≤ B, and (b) satisfy the k-large market condition, i.e.,ĉ i ≤ B/k, the ratio of the independent value of the fractional-knapsack and the correlated value of v(·) is minimized whenĉ i = B/k for all i.
Proof. For the first part of the proof, we assume that v =ĉ, i.e., that the bang-per-buck is one for all elements. The last step of the proof is to generalize this special case to any values. Observe that with this assumption, v B (S) = min(B, j∈Sĉ j ).
Assume that there is someĉ i such thatĉ i < B/k. We show that when v i =ĉ i , increasingĉ i to anyĉ i >ĉ i and decreasingq i toq i =ĉ iqi /ĉ i preserves the correlated value while only lowering the independent value. Letĉ j =ĉ j andq j =q j for j = i. The correlated value of v(·) is E S∼D [v(S)] = jĉ jqj = jĉ jq j so it is preserved. Similarly, the ex ante budget constraint is still satisfied.
The argument for the independent value decreasing is the following. Let v B (S) be defined similarly as v B (S), but where agents have values and costs equal toĉ . Condition on the subset of other agents S who accept their prices and consider the marginal contribution to the expected value of v B (·) and v B (·) from agent i. In the case that C = j∈Sĉ j > B, this contribution is zero for bothĉ i andĉ i . When C < B, these contributions areq i min(B − C,ĉ i ) andq i min(B − C,ĉ i ). By the definition ofq i =ĉ iqi /ĉ i and concavity of min(B − C, ·), the former is greater than the latter. This inequality holds for all sets S, so removing the conditioning on S, it holds in expectation and the independent value of fractional-knapsack is lowered.
It remains to extend this result to any v. Fix v and assume without loss of generality that v 1 /ĉ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ v n /ĉ n . Then the fractional-knapsack set function can be rewritten as 
since these sums telescope.
So the ratio of independent value of v B (S) to the correlated value of v(S) is minimized when the ratios of the independent value of min(B, j∈S∩{1,...,i}ĉ j ) to the correlated value of j∈S∩{1,...,i}ĉ j are minimized for all i. We conclude by observing that min(B, j∈S∩{1,...,i}ĉ j ) and j∈S∩{1,...,i}ĉ j are the fractional-knapsack set function and the additive set function when v i =ĉ i over ground set {1, . . . , i}, and that their ratio is minimized whenĉ i = B/k for all agents i.
Next, we use the result from Yan (2011) to bound the ratio of the independent value of fractionalknapsack to the correlated value of v(·).
Lemma 15. For any distribution over sets D with marginal probabilitiesq satisfying the ex ante budget constraint, i.e., iĉ iqi ≤ B, the ratio of the independent value of fractional-knapsack to the correlated value of v(·) is at least 1 − 1/ √ 2πk when the market is k-large.
Proof. Consider the case where each agent i has costĉ i = B/k and assume that the ex ante budget constraint is satisfied, so iq i ≤ k. Since any set of size at most k is feasible and since iq i ≤ k, there is a distribution such that the budget constraint is always met ex post. Therefore, the correlated value of v(·) is equal to the correlated value of fractional-knapasck. The ratio of the independent value of fractional-knapsack to the correlated value of v(·) is thus equal to the correlation gap of fractional-knapsack. Since all agents have cost B/k, the fractional-knapsack set function is equal to the k-highest-value-elements set function. By Theorem 2, the ratio of the independent value of fractional-knapsack to the correlated value of v(·) is therefore 1 − 1/ √ 2πk. By Lemma 14, the ratio of the independent value of fractional-knapsack to the correlated value of v(·) when the ex ante budget constraint is satisfied is minimized when all agents have cost B/k, so this ratio is at least 1 − 1/ √ 2πk.
We now prove the main theorem of this section which relates the approximation factor of sequential posted pricing (with ex post budget feasibility) to the optimal mechanism with ex ante budget feasibility.
Theorem 16. The sequential posted pricing mechanism (q, σ), whereq is the solution to the multilinear extension program (5) and where the order σ is decreasing in v î c i , is a (1 − 1/ √ 2πk)(1 − 1/k) approximation to the optimal mechanism in a k-large market.
Proof. Denoteq the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5). For additive value functions, linearity of expectation implies that the multilinear extension is equal to the concave closure and the optima of the multilinear extension program (5) and concave closure program (4) are the same. Their performance upper bounds that of the optimal mechanism that satisfies ex post budget feasibility by Lemma 6. The objective value of these programs with optimal solution q is i v iqi , which is equal to the correlated value of the additive set function v(·) on distributions with marginalsq. So by Lemma 15, the ratio of the independent value of fractional-knapsack to the upper bound of the optimal mechanism is at least 1 − 1/ √ 2πk The random set of agents who accept their offer in the sequential posted pricing is equal to the set of agents who are admitted by the fractional-knapsack set function on an independent random set of agents with marginalsq, without including the fractional agent. The loss from this fractional agent is at most a factor 1 − 1/k. This posted pricing mechanism therefore has an approximation ratio of (1 − 1/ √ 2πk)(1 − 1/k).
As a corollary of Lemma 15, we get new correlation gap results for the fractional, and integral, knapsack set functions.
Theorem 17. The correlation gaps of fractional-knapsack and integral-knapsack are at least 1 − 1/ √ 2πk and (1 − 1/ √ 2πk)(1 − 1/k) respectively, in a k-large market.
Proof. We first show the correlation gap of fractional-knapsack, the correlation gap of integralknapsack will then follow easily. We start by showing that the correlation gap is minimized when the budget constraint is satisfied. Then, we upper bound the fractional-knapsack correlated value by the correlated value of v(·). Finally, we apply Lemma 15. We claim that the correlation gap of fractional-knapsack is minimized when the budget constraint is satisfied. Observe that if the budget constraint is not satisfied, then it is possible to decrease someq i such that the correlated value of fractional-knapsack remains the same. Since decreasing someq i only decreases the independent value of fractional-knapsack, the ratio of the independent value to the correlated value also decreases.
Clearly, the fractional-knapsack correlated value is upper bounded by the correlated value of v(·). Therefore, the correlation gap of fractional-knapsack is at least the ratio of the independent value of fractional-knapsack to the correlated value of v(·) when the budget constraint is satisfied, so at least 1 − 1/ √ 2πk by Lemma 15. Finally, observe that the correlated value of fractional-knapsack upper bounds the correlated value of integral-knapsack and that the independent value of integral-knapsack is a 1 − 1/k approximation to the independent value of fractional-knapsack. Therefore, the correlation gap of integral-knapsack is at least (1 − 1/ √ 2πk)(1 − 1/k).
Comparison of Sequential and Oblivious posted pricing. We now show that the approximation ratio achieved using the sequential posted pricing mechanism with the bang per buck order, (1 − 1/ √ 2πk)(1 − 1/k), is strictly better than the one achieved using oblivious posted pricing where the budget is lowered, (1 − )(1 − e − 2 (1− )k/12 ), in the case of additive value functions. This improvement is especially large in the case of small markets, as shown in Figure 5 . Figure 5 also compares these approximation ratios with the one obtained by Anari et al. (2014) for additive valuation functions, (1 − 1/e)(1 − 6/(5k)). To obtain these results for oblivious posted pricing, we numerically solved for the best . We emphasize that we are not comparing the performance of these approaches but the theoretical bounds that are obtained and that the result of Anari et al. (2014) is in a different model described previously.
Lemma 18. In the case of additive functions with k ≥ 2, the approximation ratio obtained with sequential posted pricing with the bang per buck order is better than the approximation ratio obtained with oblivious posted pricing where the budget is lowered. Figure 2 : Comparison of the approximation ratios obtained by the two different approaches we consider and by Anari et al. (2014) . On the horizontal axis, k is the size of the market. Note that the approximation ratios for the sequential posted price mechanism and sealed bid mechanism hold only for additive value functions and that for the oblivious posted pricing, the results hold for any submodular value function with an additional 1 − 1/e term in the approximation ratio.
Proof. It is obvious that we can achieve better bounds using oblivious posted pricing rather than sequential posted pricing. However, since we use very different techniques to get theoretical bounds for both cases, we formally show that the bound we get for sequential posted pricing is indeed better.
The approximation ratio obtained by oblivious posted pricing is (1 − )(1 − e − 2 (1− )k/12 ) where 2/k < < 1/2. For sequential posted pricing, we obtain (1−1/ √ 2πk)(1−1/k) ≥ 1−1/ √ 2πk −1/k. If ≥ 1/ √ 2πk + 1/k, then it follows immediately that the bound for sequential posted pricing is better. Otherwise, < 1/ √ 2πk + 1/k and we get that
where the first inequality follows from the fact that 1 − e −x ≤ x for all x.
Computing Prices
In the two previous sections, we gave conditions under which optimal prices from the multilinear extension program (5) perform well when offered sequential or obliviously. In this section, we consider the computational problem of finding these prices. For submodular value functions, we reduce the problem to the well-known greedy algorithm for submodular optimization. For additive value functions, a simple method based on the Lagrangian relaxation of the budget constraint gives the optimal solution.
which can be rewritten for additive value functions as:
We show that the ex ante optimal mechanism can be found directly by taking the Lagrangian relaxation of the budget constraint (with parameter λ) of the following Lagrangian program:
For any Lagrangian parameter λ, this objective can be optimized by pointwise optimizing
k.a., the Lagrangian virtual surplus. This pointwise optimization picks all the agents such that v i ≥ λφ i (c i ). If the virtual value functions are monotone, i.e., in the so-called regular case, then this optimization gives a monotone allocation rule where an agent is picked whenever c i ≤ φ −1 i (v i /λ) Notice that as the Lagrangian parameter increases, the payments of the agents, as represented by virtual costs, become more costly in the objective of the lagrangian program (7). Thus, the expected payment of the mechanism is monotonically decreasing in the Lagrangian parameter. With λ = 0 the Lagrangian virtual surplus optimizer simply maximizes v(x) and pays each agent selected the maximum cost in the support of her distribution. If this payment is under budget then it is optimal, otherwise, we can increase λ until the budget constraint is satisfied. For example, with λ = ∞ the empty set of agents is selected and no payments are made. The optimal mechanism is the one that meets the budget constraint with equality. In the case that the expected payment is discontinuous then mixing between the least over-budget and least under-budget mechanism is optimal. For further discussion of Lagrangian virtual surplus optimizers, see Devanur et al. (2013) .
Proposition 19. The Lagrangian virtual surplus optimizer (or appropriate mixture thereof ) that meets the budget constraint with equality is the Bayesian optimal ex ante budget feasible mechanism.
Lagrangian virtual surplus optimization suggests selecting an agent i when her private cost c i is below φ −1 i (v i /λ). The mechanism that achieves this outcome posts the price ofĉ i = φ −1 i (v i /λ) to agent i. Denote byq i = F i (ĉ i ) the probability that i accepts the priceĉ i . For the pricesĉ, the total expected payments are iĉ iqi . When the virtual cost functions are monotone and strictly increasing, there is a Lagrangian parameter for which the budget constraint is met with equality, i.e., with iĉ iqi = B. The optimal ex ante mechanism is therefore the posted price mechanism that postsĉ i to each agent i for the Lagrangian parameter λ that satisfies iĉ iqi = B. Note that such a Lagrangian parameter λ can be arbitrarily well approximated since iĉ iqi is decreasing as a function of λ. 
A Reduction to the Greedy Algorithm for Submodular Optimization
For general submodular value functions we reduce the optimization of the multilinear extension program (5), restated below, to the problem of optimizing a submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint. This problem of optimizing a submodular function under cardinality, knapsack, or matroid constraints is well studied and the greedy algorithm gives a 1 − 1/e approximation for knapsack and cardinality constraints; see Nemhauser et al. (1978) , Khuller et al. (1999) , and Sviridenko (2004) .
The main difference between the multilinear extension program (5) and the knapsack setting considered in the literature is that our budget constraint is given by increasing weights, whereas the standard problem has constant weights (and is thus a linear constraint). Our reduction to the greedy algorithm is the following. We divide each agent i, called a big agent, in cost space into m discrete agents i j of equal cost, called the small agents. An agent i j corresponds to the jth increase of q i , starting from q i = 0, that has cost B/m. We set 1/m as a fraction of the total budget B which fixes the number of steps in the algorithm to be m. With large m, the reduction becomes a finer discretization. A formal description of this reduction is given below. In the discussion below we replace the inverse of the cumulative distribution function in the multilinear extension program with a generic monotone increasing function which we denote by w i (·), i.e., we substitute w i (·) = F −1 i (·). Before formally describing the reduction, we introduce some notation. For each i and j, let δ i j be the jth increase in q i , starting from q i = 0, that has cost B/m, i.e., δ i j satisfying B/m = w i ( k≤j δ i k ) · ( k≤j δ i k ) − w i ( k<j δ i k ) · ( k<j δ i k ). Given a set S of small agents, the continuous solution corresponding to S is q(S) with q i (S) = j:i j ∈S δ i j .
The reduction.
1. For each agent i, create m small agents i j where 1 ≤ j ≤ m so that the reduced instance has mn agents.
2. For each small agent i j , its cost is B/m.
3. For each small agent i j , its marginal contribution V S (i j ) in value to a set S is the marginal contribution of increasing the fraction of agent i corresponding to S by δ i j , i.e., V (q )−V (q(S)) where q i = q i (S) + δ i j and q j = q j (S) for j = i.
We show that the approximation ratio achieved using the greedy algorithm on the reduced problem is 1 − 1/e − o(1), almost matching the performance of the greedy algorithm for knapsack constraint with integral agents and constant weights. We start by showing that with access to exact values of the increases δ i j and of the marginal contributions V S (i j ), the approximation ratio is 1 − 1/e − o(1). Then, we show that it is possible to approximate δ i j and V S (i j ) with estimates that cause an additional loss of o(1) to the approximation ratio.
With exact values of δ i j and V S (i j ). We consider the case where the exact values of the increases in q and marginal contributions are given by an oracle. We show that finding a good solution to this reduced problem with small agents gives us a good solution to the problem with big agents.
Lemma 20. The optimal solution S to the reduced problem satisfies V (q(S )) ≥ (1 − o(1))V (q) whereq is the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5).
Proof. We pick the step size to be m = n 2 . The proof shows that there exists a set S that is close to a feasible solution in the reduced problem and such that q(S) is a better solution thanq. Let S be the set of small agents such that q(S) is maximized subject to q(S) ≤q. Define S +1 to be the set containing all small agents in S and one additional small agent for each big agent i. Observe that V (q(S +1 )) ≥ V (q) since V (·) is non-decreasing. So there is a feasible solution to the discretized problem such that if we add one small agent for each big agent i, then we obtain a better solution than the optimal solution to the original problem.
Greedily remove agents by minimal marginal contribution from S +1 until we get a feasible solution S. The number of small agents who need to be removed is n since S is feasible. Since S contains n 2 small agents, by the greediness and the fact V (·) is concave along any line of positive direction, (1 + 1/n)V (q(S)) ≥ V (q(S +1 )).
Therefore,
Next, we show that the reduced problem can be optimized.
Lemma 21. Let S be the set returned by the greedy algorithm for submodular functions under a cardinality constraint on the reduced problem, then V (q(S)) ≥ (1 − 1/e)V (q(S * )) where S * is the optimal solution to the reduced problem.
Proof. Observe that the objective function in the reduced problem is a submodular function. This follows directly from the concavity of V (·) along any positive line of direction. In addition, since all small agents have cost B/m, the constraint is a cardinality constraint. Since the greedy algorithm for submodular functions under a cardinality constraint is a 1 − 1/e approximation for submodular functions, we get the desired result.
We now have the tools to show that if we had an oracle for the increases and marginal contributions, the greedy algorithm on the reduced instance would give us a 1 − 1/e − o(1) approximation.
Lemma 22. Let S be the output of the greedy algorithm on the reduced instance, where exact values of δ i j and V S (i j ) are given by an oracle at each iteration, then V (q(S)) ≥ (1 − 1/e − o(1))V (q), whereq is the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5).
Proof. We combine the results from the discretization that causes a o(1) loss with the greediness of the algorithm that is a 1 − 1/e approximation to obtain the desired result.
By Lemma 21 and Lemma 20, V (q(S)) ≥ (1 − 1/e)V (q(S * )) ≥ (1 − 1/e − o(1))V (q)
where S * is the optimal solution to the reduced problem.
With estimates of δ i j and V S (i j ). We now show that we can use the greedy algorithm with estimates of the increases and the marginal contributions, that we can compute. Letq(S) be defined similarly to q(S) but with estimatesδ i j . The first lemma shows that the value of the optimal solution to the reduced problem has almost the same value as when the increases δ i j are estimated. The second lemma extends Lemma 21 to the case where greedy is run with estimated marginal contributionsṼ S (i j ) and anyδ i j . We defer the proofs of these two lemmas to the appendix.
Lemma 23. Let S * be the optimal solution to the reduced problem with exact value of δ i j and V S (i j ), then V (q(S * )) ≥ (1 − o(1))V (q(S * )).
Lemma 24. LetS be the set returned by the greedy algorithm on the reduced problem with estimates δ i j andṼ S (i j ), then V (q(S)) ≥ (1 − 1/e − o(1))V (q(S * )) w.h.p., where S * is the optimal solution to the reduced problem with estimatesδ i j and exact values V S (i j ).
Combining the previous results, we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 25. LetS be the output by the greedy algorithm on the reduced instance with estimates of δ i j and V S (i j ), then V (q(S)) ≥ (1 − 1/e − o(1))V (q) w.h.p., whereq is the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5).
Proof. This proof follows similarly to the one for Lemma 22, the difference is that this proof adds the loss from the estimates. By Lemma 23 and Lemma 24,
where S * is the optimal solution to the reduced problem. Using Lemma 20 that connects the discretized reduced instance to the original continuous problem, we conclude that V (q(S)) ≥ (1 − 1/e − o(1))V (q(S * )) ≥ (1 − 1/e − o(1))V (q).
Note that in the case of additive value functions, the greedy algorithm is optimal when the optimization is subject to a cardinality constraint and the marginal contributions can be computed exactly. We therefore get the following result.
Lemma 26. Assume v(·) is an additive value function. Let S be the set returned by the greedy algorithm on the reduced problem with estimatesδ i j , then V (q(S)) ≥ (1 − o(1))V (q) w.h.p., wherê q is the optimal solution to the multilinear extension program (5).
Therefore, all the results in previous sections suffer an extra 1 − 1/e − o(1) factor in the general case of submodular value function and an extra 1 − o(1) factor in the case of additive value function that are due to computational constraints.
Conclusion
We consider questions of budget feasibility in a Bayesian setting. We show that simple posted pricing mechanisms are ex post budget feasible and approximate the Bayesian optimal mechanism. Our main analysis considers the ex ante relaxation where the budget constraint is allowed to hold in expectation. Good approximations are obtained when this ex ante relaxation is optimized for a slightly reduced budget or when the agents are ordered by bang-per-buck (value divided by offered price). The latter approach, in the case of additive value functions where it applies, gives better bounds.
Another method for designing posted pricing mechanisms from the literature comes from the generalized magician's problem from Alaei (2014) . Unfortunately, this approach does not satisfy the monotonicity property of Theorem 9 needed to apply known results that give a good approximation in the case of submodular functions. Thus, it is unclear whether this approach can be adapted to budget feasibility question.
